BACK TO THE FUTURE: DE FACTO HOSTILITIES,
TRANSNAT ION AL TERRORISM, AND THE PURPOSE OF
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
G�OFr:REY S. CORN'
In the aftermath or World War JI, the internation<ll community
set about to revise the
treaties that emerged

Gen eva

Conventior1s.

from this

Three of the

foL;r

effort, all of which hel d been

adopted to mitigate the SLLffering of v·icti ms of war, were in force
chtring lhc War.

flowever, it WCIS the failure of the lC1W lo fully

accomplish their humc:�nitadan purpose that animC!tcd the revision
efforts.

These efforts cuI rn. inated

in

1949

with

fom

treaties

add ressi r1 g the plight of four particular groups of war victims,
treaties which have since earned the distinction of being the only
interncttional agreements to be universally ratified.
The substantive

(" LOAC')

advances in the Law of Armed

contained in these Lreaties ref1ecl these.

Of

Conflict

the mAny

lessons learned in the (/battle laboratory'' of World Warn, perhaps
most profound was that even Lhe most comprehensive

treaty

t e
regime is m.eaningless w1less it is applied and respected by h
parties loa conflict. Prior to 'vVor!d War II, it was simply assumed
that the law este1blished to regulate war would apply to war.
However, the limits of this assumption were exposed during both
World War lJ and the civil wars that occurred the inter-war years .
.J
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Although these events satisfied any pr a grnatic definition of" w ar ,''

de facto standard for determining when lhe law of
war (a term that i s today synonymous 'v\'ith humanitarian law or
the law of armed confl ict) became obligatory, wets exp loited by
st a tes whe.n they used what can only be d esc ribed as crcalivt:
interpretations to di savov\' the corttlicl they were engaged in WC1S J
war as that term v.·as defined bv international la w.
fn respon se1 the drafters of lhc Conycntions included the first
ever lTeaty " triggering'' pr o vision s. Their purpose was to c reate �1
truly d e facto standard for detennining wheJ1 lhe law would apply
to protect the victims of war.
As a result, the foca] point for
determining appl icab i li ty -vvould no longer be "w ar " - a krn1.
susceptibl e to
interp retive avoidance- but instet1d h arrn e d
conflict." Accordin gly, the second article common to the four
treaties (" Common Article 2'') re<-tu ired application of the full
cor pus of the treaties to any international- or inter-state- armed
conflict. And, in response to the reality t hat even in a purely intra
state con.text armed hostilities between co mpeting armed entities
coul d becorn e sufficiently intense as to amount to de facto armed
conflict, all four treaties also included an article re q uirin g the
humane treatment of any per son not participa ting in hostilities
during non-internaUonal arn1ed con flicts within the territory of a
state (intra-state armed co nflict) : Comn1on Article 3. Al though
neither of these trea ty p rovif;io ns explicitly indicated that lheir
effect was to trigg er not only the treaty provisions contained in lhe
Conventions but all other provisions of the LOAC, they rapidly
evolved to have such effect.
From 1949 to 2001, t his law tri ggering paradigm became a
genuin e article of fa ith. Military lawyersj gover nment and. non
govern ment experts, aca dem ics an d judges cClllcd upon to apply
the law of armed conflict relied on lhis Common A rticle 2/3
"eithe r/ or" armed conflict d icho tom y c\S the definitive standard for
determining situations requiring app li cati on oi LOAC obligations
and authorities.
HovveveJ, during this same p er iod
an d
partic ul arly followi ng the end of the Cold Wac cmned fo rces of
many nations found themselves en �aged in operat ion s that fell
the absence of a

,·

,

,

somewhere in the twilight zone between

e xecuting

''"'1r

and peace when

the ubiquitous "peace keeping''

mission. These fo rces
were instructed by t heir legal advisors t ha t s uch ope ration s were
not technically regulated by the LOAC because they failed to fall
within the C mn mon Artic.le 2/3 paradigm.
Nonetheless, as a
matter of national

(and

sometimes multi-natjonal) poUcy, LOAC
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principles vvere invoked to provide an effective and consistent
operational regulatory frame·work.
Peacekeeping operations

were,

hovvever,

measure bv the absence of hostilities.
J

defined

in

large

Even when they involved
-

small scale hostilities, like U.S. operations in Somalia in

1992,

the

general nature of the missions coupled with the application of
LOAC principles as a matter of national policy obviated any need
to critique the inherent limitations of the Common Article
triggering paradign1.
question

2/3

law

As " result, little attention -vvas pClid to the

of whether the Common Article

2/3

standard was

sufficiently comprehensive to C\ddress the realities of a rapidly
changing

military

operatiom1l

environment.

The

events

of

September 11, or more precisely the U.S. response to those events,
-.vould render this critique unavoidable.
lmmediatelv after these infamous strikes on the U.S. homeland,
J

President Bush made clear that the United States considered itself
the victim of an arn1ed attack and that the struggle against AI
Qaeda was an "armed conflict."

This language was not mere

hyperbole. Instead, it represented a clear demarcation for a "new"
approach to the slruggle against international Lerrorism.

For the

first time since the inception of the Geneva Convention's Common
Article

2/3

engaged in

triggering paradigm, a state asserted that it was
an

armed conflict of international scope with a non

state entity. No longer would this struggle be characterized as an
exercise of international law enforcement.

Instead, the United

States would use the instruments and authority of armed conflict
to bring this non-state enemy to submission.

While this armed

conflict characterization was rejected by some as invalid, in the
months and years following the attacks of September 11 all tluee
branches of the U.S. government would endorse the decision by
President Bush to define the struggle within this law of armed
conflict legal framework.
Designating the

struggle

against a

transnational

non-state

opponent as an C\rmed conflict seemed, at least at the military
operational level, logicaL US armed forces were directed to seek
out and engage Al Qaeda operatives with combat power, and to
detain

captured i\1 Quedu

personnel

returning to the "global fight."

to

prevent

them from

However, a legal incongruity was

almost inm1ediately exposed: while the United States had invoked
the most fundamental authority associated with armed conflict
the authority derived from the principle of military necessity
(which included the authority to employ deadly combat power as a
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n1easure of first resort)- the transnationaI scope of the non-state
enetDy excluded the conflict from the Common Article 2/3
"either/ or" paradigm. According to the President, because Al
Qaeda was not a state, the armed conflict did not trigger the full
corpus of the law pursuant to Con1n1on Article 2; and because the
conflict was not "internal/' it did not trigger even the m.inirT1um
humane treatment obligation of Common Article 3.
This incongruity would be fully exposed by the status Clnd
treatment standards adopted for captured AI Qaeda operatives. In
his February 7, 2002 finding, President Bush explicitly disavowed
any United States obligation to comply with the law of arm.ed
conflict vis a vis these detainees. The United States was not even
bound by the minimum humane treatment obligation of Common
f\rticle 3 because of the transnational scope of the armed conflict.
This incongruity was further exposed by President Bush when
he ordered the trial and capture of AI QC�eda operatives before a
military commission for violations of the laws and customs of WC\f.
This invocation of the LOAC as a source of authority to condemn
the conduct of captured Al Qaeda operatives �:vould lead to Salim
Hamdan's challenge of the legality of his trial by military
commission. This challenge would ultimately reach the Supreme
Court, where Hamdan asserted that the procedures for his military
commission violated the Common Article 3's humane treatment
mandate. In response, the Supreme Court interpreted Common
Article 3 to apply in "contradistinction" to Common Article 2. In
so doing, the Court effectively rejected the President's selective
invocation of the law by holding that any armed conflict not
regulated by Common Article 2 was ipso facto regulated by
Connnon Article 3. However, it was also clear that the Court also
endorsed the armed conflict characterization of the struggle against
transnationa 1 terra rism.
Almost immediately following this landmark decision, Israel
launched a major combat operation into Lebanon against
Hezbollah forces. Neither Israel nor Lebanon asserted that they
were engaged in an inter-state armed conflict. Instead, Israel and
the non-state entity Hezbollah engaged in intense hostilities,
aln10st all of which occurred outside Israeli territory.
The
confluence of these two events generated a subtle but profound
reassessment of the Common Article 2/3 law-triggering standard.
The longstanding assumption thClt the inter-state v. intra-state
paradigm provided the exclusive trigger for LOAC application
seemed increasingly invalid. Both the United States and Israel
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engaged in hostilities against non-state transnational enemies,
employing force in a manner that certainly indicated the existence
of de facto armed conflict. For the Supreme Court, this assertion of
authority for purposes of trying a captured opponent with an
accordant rejection of obligation derived from the same law
resulted in an interpretation of Common Article 3's scope arguably
inconsistent ·with the accepted understanding of the treaty. A
similar reaction followed fsr<.1el's use of combat power in Lebanon:
govermnent ar1d non-governmental critics of both Israeli and
Hezbollah tactics consistently invoked LOAC principles to support
their positions. The world had witnessed once again the inevitable
reality of war: the unleashing of combat power to disable or
destroy a designated enemy. And, international reactiort to these
operations quite logically dem�anded compliance with "rules" to
regulate the application of such power, protect innocent victims of
the hostilities, and to ensure the humane treatment of captured
opponents. Like the Supreme Court, the existence of de facto
hostilities and the invocation of armed conflict authority by the
state seemed to override the inherent limitations of the Comn1on
Article 2/3 law-triggering paradigm; which proved no impediment
to the assertion that both Israel and Hezbollah were bound to
comply with the law of war.
By the summer of 2006, a realization appeared to be emerging
in the international community: LOAC regulation is essential
during nll armed conflicts. While this might seem axiomatic, from
a legal perspective it was anything but. Because the armed conflict
characterization of the struggle against transnational non-state
entities did not ''fit" within the Common Article 2/3 law-triggering
paradigm, it was met with widespread criticism. But this criticism
failed to recognize what was exposed first by the Guantanamo
experience and subsequently by Israeli operations in Lebanon:
armed conflict is defined by operational reality, not by whether a
given operation "fits" within the Common Article 2/3 paradigm ..
It was becoming apparent that irrespective of the inter-state v.
intra-state limiting interpretation of the law, states were using
military power in a manner that appeared to create the risks
historicc:tlly associated with armed conflict. As a rP.sult, thf' s;:mlE'
critics who challenged the legitimacy of the U.S. invocation of
LOAC authority were increasingly demanding compliance -vvith
LOAC collstrnints, implicitly acknowledging the applicability of the
LOAC outside the inter-state v. intra-state law trio-o-erinooo
0
paradigm.
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The ultirnate irony in this law applicability deb21te is thC'It the
intent of the 1949 Conventions b<id been flipped on its proverbial
head. Of all the LOAC advancements contained in those tour
treaties, the most profound was the express rejection of creative
law avoidance. The purpose ot the ''armed conflict" law triggt:'r
was to ensure that ITumanitarian protections came into force ba�t:>d
n.ol on legalistic definitions and interpretations of the term. "w<n,"
but instead on <1 tru ly de facto criterion. That criterion was armed
conflict, which denoted Fl situation of armed hostilities justifying
the imposition of international legal constrCiints on the participants.
Once hostilities existed, the humtlnitari::m interests of victims
required a lnw-trigg..:ring st<mdard that prevenled states from
disavowing constraints <:�nd obligations ill the core of humanitarian
law. Even in the rec:dm of intra-state armed conflict, which up until
19L19 had been regarded as immune frorn international regulation,
both state and non-state <1ctors would be compelled to respect the
n1ost basic lim.italion.s on their conduct tlwough the requirement to
ensure the humane treatment of all those actively engaged in
hostilities.
However, because the drafters of the Geneva Conventions
focused on the two types o£ conilict prevalent between World War
1 and 1949, nc1rneLy inter-state and intra-state conflict; tbe law
triggers they adopted became synonymous with only these types
of am1ed conflict. Thus, in the aftermath of September 11., this
inter-state v. inh·a-state paradjgm was reLied upon to assert that the
law did not apply to transnational non-state actors, even though
the United States was invoking the authority of war to disable this
enemy. This "authority without obligation" interpretation of the
treaties was thus deriv�d from a credible interpretation of
Common Articles 2 and 3, but it defied the underlying spirit of
these provisions. lt also distorted the purpose of the law itself,
which has alwavs been to strike an efficient balance between lhe
authority of military necessity <md tl1c constraints of tl1e dictates of
humanity.
Rejection of this selective invocation of aut hori ty \!Vithout
obligation was central to the Supreme Court's "contradistinction"
interpretation of Common Article 3. But this was jusl the lip of the
proverbial iceberg. Designating the struggle against transnationC\i
terrorism as an armed conflict has necessitated a re-evaluation of
the entire law triggering paradigm. The Court's interpretation of
Common Article 3 was effective to ensure the humane treatment of
detainees- the isbue the Supreme Court confronted in Hamdan-
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Cornm.on Article 3 provides no regulation for the application of
combat power. As a result, the Hn111dan decision did not address
the broader question of what rules regulate hostilities between
state and transnational non-state cntitiE�S. The Israel and Hezbollah
conflict confirmed this by exposing the world to the reality that
conflict regulation becornes essential when the first salvo is fired,
and not just when opponents arc detained.
This process of reconsideration has stirred vigorous debate in
the circles of LOAC expertise. Many scholars reject the assertion.
t hat the LOAC applies outside the intE�r-state v. intra-·state context,
arguing tl1at operations conducted against transnational terrorists
are properly categorized within the law enforcement Jegai
framework. However, this Ztpproach is increasingly rejected by
experts within the milit<1ries responsible for executing these
operations. This divide is particularly instructive, for it reveals an
underlying defect in the rejection of the transnational armed
conflict trigger for applicability of the LOAC regulatory
framework: the failure to recognize that the ultimate purpose of
Common Articles 2 and 3.
The great innovation of these treaty provisions was the
recognition that armed conflict must dictate applicability of law,
and this applicability must be based on a truly de facto assessment
of the existence of armed conflict. Neither the nature of the enemy,
nor the geographic scope of operations against that enemy should
be dispositive in determining the existence of armed conflict. What
is emerging in response to the reality of "transnational" anned
conflict is an understanding that any armed conflict triggers a
customary regulatory framework composed of foundational LOAC
principles. These principles are esserttial not only to ensure the
humane treatment of captured and deitained enemy personnel, but
also to effectively regulate the application of combat power. As a
result, in addition to the humane treatment mandate derived from
Common Article 3, they include: 1) the principles of military
necessity (which itself refiects an inherent balance between power
and restraint by authorizing only those m.easures that are not
otherwise forbidden by international .lavv); 2) distinction (limiting
attacks to only lt1wful militt1ry objectives); 3) proportionality
(imposing an obligation to balance ithe advantage of an attack
against the anticipated but non-purposeful infliction of harm to
innocents); and 4) a prohibition against inDiction of unnecessary
suffering (prohibiting the infliction of superfluous injury or
suffering to lawful objects of attack). These four principles provide
but
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the foundation for the regulation of all hostilities, and failure to
acknowledge their applicability to any armed is inconsistent not
only with the common sense expectations of the international
community, but more importantly with the interests of the armed
forces required to engage in such operations.
This re-assessment of the situations that trigger LOAC
applicability is perhaps the most significant development in this
area of international law since the International Crimi.nal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") begcm to inject LOAC
regulation into the realm� of internc1l anned conflict. Both of these
developments share a common connection: the recognition that
effective regulation of hostilities cannot be nullified by an inflexible
approach to treaty application. just as the ICTY determined that
essential regulatory principles evoived fron1 treaties applicable
only to inter-state armed conflict had "migrated" to the realm of
intra-state armed conflict, there is an analogous recognition
emerging that these principles must also "migrate" to the realm of
transnational armed conflicts. While opposition to this proposition
is undoubtedly inevitable, the increasing reliance on this expanded
conception of LOAC applicability by anTted forces suggests that
this opposition is not based on a genuine appreciation of the
underlying logic and purpose of the LOAC, but instead on the type
of inflexible adherence to treaty interpretation that the ICTY
concluded was inconsistent with the purpose of the law.
Acknowledging the need to ensure transnational armed
conflicts are subject to LOAC regulation does not, however, resolve
the even more difficult question of how to define these armed
conflicts. While the assertion that the law enforcement legal
framework applies to all operations conducted against
transnational non-state opponents is both illogical and overbroad,
it would be equally illogical and overbroad to suggest all such
operations are armed conflicts. What is necessary is to identify a
logical and effective criterion to distinguish between non-conflict
and armed conflict uses of military power in state efforts in the
struggle against transnational terrorism. What this suggests is that
contrary to the hyperbolic designation of a "Global War/' a much
more precise conception of the military cornponent of this struggle
is necessary.
The most fundan1ental distinction between law enforcement
and Mmed conflict is the nature and extent of the authority for the
use deadly force. At the most basic level, law enforcement treats
the use of deadly force as a measure of last resort. In contrast,
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armed conflict is defined by the authority to use deadly force as a
measure of first resort.
de facto indication

This dichotomy provides the most logical

of armed

conflict:

armed conflict exists

whenever a state employs armed force and grants that force the
authority to use deadly force against an opponent as a measure of
first resort.

This is intuitive to military professionals increasingly

competent in the full spectrum of operatior1s.

They understand

that patrolling the streets in Kosovo or Bosnia is not arn1ed confLict
because their use of force authority is purely responsive.

In

contrast, whether engaging terrorist operatives in the mountains of
Afghanistan, a base camp in Somalia, or the hills of southern
Lebanon, it is the authority to engage an opponent with deadly
combat power once that opponent is identified that defines such
operations as armed conflict.
Moving towards a broader conception of LOAC applicability is
essential

to

implemented:

ensure

the

fundamental

balancing

authority

conduct of armed hostilities.

purpose

and

of

restraint

the

lavv

during

is
the

Denying the applicability of this law

to situations involving the application of combat power implicitly
based on the LOAC principle of military objective- a principle that
permits the use of deadly force as a measure of first resort- results
in a distortion of this balance.

It also deprives the armed forces of

the framework developed to guide their conduct in the n10st brutal
environments, an outcome that is not only inconsistent with the
general perception of what is "right" or "moral," but also with the
preservation of disciplined and morally based armed forces.
Like the military professionals who sowed the historic seeds of
battlefield regulation that blossomed into the law of armed conflict,
the drafters of the

1949

Geneva Conventions understood this, and

in response they included articles in those treaties intended to
prevent nullification of this regulatory framework based on politics
and legal technicalities.

But they could only respond to the legal

deficiencies they had so painfully experienced, and in so doing
created

a

law triggering paradigm that evolved to be restricted to

that context.

Although never fully responsive to the reality of

contemporary military operations, the use of policy gap fillers
negated the operational impact of the lacuna resulting from this
restrictive interpretation.

However, the selective invocation of

authority without obligation that defined the Bush administration
response to the terror attacks of September 11 exposed the limits of
policy, and initiated a reconsideration of the limits of the law
triggering paradigm. itself.

Subsequent events in Lebanon a11.d
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more rece ntly in Gaza r(;'inforccd the imper.:1tive need to ensure
that w hen

a

sta te invokes the a u thori t y or the LOAC- namely the

w i th d ea d l y combat power

c:mthority to engage a n op po nen t
other p r i nc iples must come
balance is

force to ensure

into

t h i s h j s toric

presL·rvcd.

The m i l it,lr�' component of the struggle aga i n st trc-msnational
terrorism

will

challenges for
to

,1 lmost
uur

this threat

certa i n l y

continue

to

present complex

nJtion. .:�nct other nations compelled to resp o nd

with

armed force.

B u t such complexity

is n o t

unpreced e n ted in the history o f vVCirfare. Co n d u cti ng military
operations agninsl highly orgElnized non-state actors has been an
aspect of tl1c Amcric;m w<�y o f
nation.

What

is

nevv

is

the

WC\r since tbe i n ce p tion of the
suggestion that based on the

transnRtioncl l non-state m1Lme of the enemy these operations fall
into a legc1l ''bl<�ck hole," permitti.n� states to selectively i n voke
Lhose LOAC principles that serve their interests. Such a s u gges tio n
fundamentally undermi nes the
armed force,

c rea te s a

bas ic

d a ngerous

"charter" of a professional

risk of enco u ra g i ng the darkest

instincts of those called upon to "deliver" results, and corrodes Lhe
moral integrity nf the men and women w}lo serve this nation. Only
a rejection of thi� proposition artd an endorsement of the obligation
to comply with

,1

rrMncwork of bosic LO!\C

p rinci pl es during a l l

armed conflicts \viii preserve the <�ppropriate balance between the
dictates of necessity and

the i n terests of hl.tnlanity.

ou tcome i s more than logical.

Su ch

significant advancement in lhe LOAC

produced

by

the 194�

Geneva Conventions: a categorical rej ection of law avoida nce.
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